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WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES: DOES FEDERAL CONTROL
INUNDATE THE WETLAND?
United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974)
Defendant developer had begun filling a 281 acre tract on Florida's west
coast known as Harbor Isle. This area, though above the mean high water
line, was washed by tides 50 to 100 times a year and was interlaced with
nonnavigable artificial mosquito canals.' Charging that defendant was dumping sand, dirt, dredged spoil and biological materials without obtaining per2
mits required by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA)
and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 3 the United States sought a preliminary injunction. At issue was the extent of federal control over both the
wetlands and the activities of the developer.4 Addressing this issue, a federal
district court granted the injunction and HELD, federal jurisdiction constitutionally extends to all waters of the United States affected by interstate
commerce without regard to their navigability s and therefore defendant's
fill activity required a permit under FWPCA6
In Gibbons v. Ogden7 Chief Justice Marshall initially recognized federal
regulatory power over water resources under the commerce clause for the
maintenance of navigation. Navigable waters were classically defined in The
Daniel Balls as those waterbodies in fact navigable for commercial purposes.9
This definition, though occasionally refined, 0 remained essentially unaltered

1. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§1251 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972) [hereinafter cited as FWPCA]. The action
was brought specifically under §1311(a) of the Act.
3. 33 U.S.C. §§401 et seq. (1970). Action was brought under §§403 and 407.
4. 373 F. Supp. at 668.
5. Id. at 673.
6. Id. at 676.
7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). "All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce' to comprehend navigation." Id. at 190. One commentator has
stated: "Few people appreciated the nationalistic implication of Gibbons, since the broader
significance of this opinion became evident only with time." Baldwin, The Impact of the
Commerce Clause on the Riparian Rights Doctrine, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 370, 377 (1963). See
also Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters. The Navigation Power and the Rule of
No Compensation, 3 NATURAL Rasotacas J. 1, 9 (1963).
8. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
9. "Those waters must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable
in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." Id. at 563.
The English common law definition of navigable waters (those subject to the ebb and flow
of tides) had already been discarded as water traffic on American inland lakes and rivers
expanded. The Propeller Gennessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851).
10. See, e.g., Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 633 (1900) (holding that capacity to
float a small boat did not indicate navigability unless related somehow to conveyance of
commerce); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commissioners, 168 U.S.
349, 359 (1897) (holding a river navigable even though some sections were suitable only
for carrying logs); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874) (holding navigability
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until 1899 when the Supreme Court in United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co.11 subtly modified the navigability doctrine. In Rio Grande the
Court ruled that an obstruction on a nonnavigable tributary of a navigable
stream could be regulated if the obstruction would affect downstream capacity.12 Thus, federal jurisdiction was expanded from the physical limitation
of those rivers and lakes capable of carrying commerce to nonnavigable waters
merely affecting a navigable body of water.
As increased commercial uses for water developed in the twentieth century1 3 the term "navigable waters" was redefined. This redefinition occurred
in cases involving application of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920,14
passed by Congress to regulate construction of hydroelectric power plants. Because the Act's licensing provision was limited to dams constructed on navigable
waters, the definition of such waters was expanded to include any stream that
had been used for navigation in the past, regardless of its present condition.Ultimately, in United States v. Appalachian Power Co.1 6 the Court brought
a hydroelectric plant on a nonnavigable stream under the licensing authority
of the federal government by further stretching the navigability test to include waters that could be made navigable by "reasonable improvements."'The Court discussed the powers of Congress under the commerce clause, suggesting that federal jurisdiction was not restricted by navigability.8 Having
read the Federal Water Power Act to require licenses only on navigable waterways, the Court granted jurisdiction by redefining "navigable waters" broadly
to include all but the smallest stream. 9 In a later power plant decision 2 0 the

not dependent on the mode by which commerce is conducted or on the difficulty involved).
11. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
12. Id.
13. As the nation's economy progressed from agricultural to industrial, government was
forced to change its water law. Baldwin, supra note 7, at 384.
14. 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§791 et seq. (1970).
15. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
16. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
17. Id. at 408. In fact, the Court held that improvement need not be authorized, much
less completed; congressional power was not to be hampered by improvement costs. Id. The
dissent pointed out, however, that the "reasonable" cost of blasting channels, digging canals,
and building dams had been so expensive that Congress had abandoned an earlier attempt
to make the New River into a water highway. Id. at 433-34.
18. Id. at 427. "The Congressional authority under the commerce clause is complete
unless limited by the Fifth Amendment."
19. Id. A liberal reading of Appalachian supports the argunent that the decision ended
the navigability standard as a prerequisite to federal control. The Court stated: "In our
view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of the United States over
its waters is limited to control for navigation .... In truth the authority of the United
States is the regulation of Commerce on its waters." The Court specifically named flood
protection, watershed development, and utilization of water power as aspects of commerce
control. Id. at 426. See Baldwin, supra note 7, at 386-88. It has been suggested as well that
federal jurisdiction was fully extended by the Rio Grande decision. See Johnson & Austin,
Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NATURAL RUSOuRCaS
J. 1, 13 (1967).
20. Federal Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965). At issue was whether
a pumped storage hydroelectric facility could be required to be licensed under the Federal
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Court discarded by implication the navigability requirement for regulation
of activities having an impact on commerce in general.2'
Reacting to the increasing threat of water pollution, Congress enactedlegislation directed toward establishment of a system of national regulation
and control 22 Nevertheless, after a pair of landmark decisions calling for- a,
broad reading of the statute 23 the Rivers and Harbors Act of 189924 became
the mainstay of water pollution control. 25 Initially, the Supreme Court failed
to, specify whether activities prohibited by the Act must have some vestigal
effect on .navigation.26 A recent decision, however, held that pollution could
be banned or regulated under the Act without regard to any effect on navigatioft 7 ":

"

"

The. Federal'Watdr:P6lluti6n COhtrol'Act of 1972 was enacted as a com-

Power -Act, -16 U.S.C. -§81
(1970).: The-Act had not been amended, but the Court recoisfd red the'intent OF'Congress a Tlie .time- of its passage- and concluded that the'Act
was designed to require licensing of any water power facility affecting commerce. -81 U.S.
at- 109...
21. ld.'See also Farmington River Power Co. v. Federal Power'Comm'n, 455 F.2d -86, 89
(2d Cir. 1972); Central Maine Power Co.- v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 F.2d 875, 876 (1st
Cir. 1965); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608,
613 (2d Cir, 19i5), cert. denied, 384 U.S.,941 -(1966). .Bat ef. Nantahala Power & Light Co.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 384 F.2d 200, 202-03 -(4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 -U.S. 945(1968)..22:''The maximum scope bf these itatutes was, however, limited td navigable, waters.
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amends. of 1961. Pub.- L.. No. 87-88, §1(a), 75
Stat, 204. In -other statutes federal jurisdiction was limited to. more restrictive standards.
See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, &1,62 Stat. 1155 (limiting jurisdiction to interstate waters); Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, §l(a), 79 Stat.
903 (setting quality standards for interstate waters only). See also Smith, Highlights of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 77 DIcK. L. REV. 459, 463 (1973).
23. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
24. 33 U.S.C. §§401 et seq. (1970).
25. See Comment, Discharging New Wine Into Old Wineskins: The Metamorphosis of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 Parr. L. REV. 483, 509-31 (1972). The Act has been
used primarily to control dredge and fill operations. Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and
Fill Jurisdiction:Buttressing a Citadel Under Siege, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 19 (1973).
26. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 226 (1966), where the Court
stated: "[Oil's] presence in our rivers and harbors is both a menace to navigation and a
pollutant." Lower federal courts, however, dropped the effect on navigation requirement.
The leading case is Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910
(1971), where the Court affirmed a denial of a dredge and fill permit for ecological reasons,
reversing the district court opinion in Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
Ruling against federal jurisdiction, the same district that decided the instant case had
issued a prophetic challenge: "As this opinion is being prepared the Congress is in session.
Advocates -of conservation are both able and effective. The way is open to obtain a remedy for
future situation' like 'this if one is needed and can be legally granted by the Congress."Id. at 771.
27. United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1978). The Court
ruled that the Corps of Engineers' authority was not restricted to controlling activities affecting navigation. "[The Act] is to be read in accordance with its plain langage'as "imposing
a flat ban on the unauthorized deposit of foreign substances into navigable waters, regardless
of the effect on navigation." Id. at 671.
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prehensive solution to the problems of water pollution control. 28 At the time
of the Act's passage it was debatable whether federal jurisdiction over water
resources was still governed by the navigability standard. 29 Although FWPCA
employs the term "navigable waters" to designate those waters affected by
the Act, 30 the term is defined broadly as "waters of the United States." 31 No
further definition of "waters of the United States" is included in FWPCA.
Thus, in deciding cases brought under the Act courts must face three problems: (1) Can Congress constitutionally extend its control beyond navigable
waters? (2) Did Congress so extent its jurisdiction? and (3) What is the
scope of federal jurisdiction under FWPCA?
Responding to the first question the instant court held that the exercise
of congressional power over water resources is constitutional regardless of the
navigability of the water involved?3 - The court characterized the navigable
waters limitation as an anachronistic remnant of the earlier concepts of com34
33
merce as involving only transportation. Thus, the Rivers and Harbors Act,
35
which was used to control dredge and fill operations was logically limited
to navigable waters, as only those waters could affect transportation.36 The
3
instant court found that expansive interpretations of the commerce clause 7
require only a "reasonable relation to, or effect on, interstate commerce" by
an activity regulated by Congress.3 8 Water pollution, the court stated, obviously affects interstate commerce, and therefore dredging and filling may
be regulated as a pollution creating activity3 9 To hold that only pollution
in navigable waters could affect interstate commerce, the court declared,
"would be contrary to reason." 40
Consideration of the second question, whether Congress intended to extend federal jurisdiction beyond navigable waters, was complicated by use of
the term "navigable waters" in the FWPCA. Finding "verbal acrobatics"

28. Smith, supra note 22, at '459.
29. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., FPWCA, 33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1) (Stpp. II, 1972): "It is the national goal
that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985."
31. 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) (Supp. II, 1972): "The term 'navigable waters' means the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas."
32. 373 F. Supp. at 673.
33. "Although the reach of federal power tinder the commerce clause widened dramatically in the twentieth century, the nineteenth century legacy of 'navigation' lingered
to limit federal control over water pollution." Id. at 669.
34. 33 U.S.C. §§401 et seq. (1970).
35. See F-oyer, supra note 25, at 23-24.
36. 373 F. Supp. at 669-70.
37. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 116 (1970) (permitting federal regulation
of loansharking as an activity within a class affecting commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a local
restaurant under the commerce clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (applying the Civil Rights Act to a motel).
38. 373 F. Supp. at 673.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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necessary to ascertain the clear meaning of the statute, 41 the court turned
to an examination of the legislative history of FWPCA. The scope of the Act
was originally restricted to navigable waters, but the definition "waters of
the United States" was substituted with the expressed intention of broadening the Act's jurisdiction. 42 This indicated to the court that Congress intended to eliminate the navigability element altogether. Support for this interpretation was found in the only other decision addressing the scope of FWPCA,
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co. 43 In Ashland criminal
sanctions were imposed under FWPCA for an oil spill that occurred in a nonnavigable tributary. The Ashland court found jurisdiction clear: "[A] citizen
simply inserts the statutory definition in place of the term 'navigable
45
This reading of FWPCA was adopted by the instant court.
waters.' ,,44
Along with its discussion of navigable waters the instant court found it
necessary to consider the mean high water mark. 46 In tideland areas such as
the west coast of Florida the mean high water mark establishes the limit of
navigable waters and, therefore, the limit of federal control under earlier
legislation.47 The court discussed the history of judicial use of the mean high
water line48 and determined that the standard did not contradict exercise of
4
federal control, either constitutionally or under FWPCA. 9
The only remaining question was whether FWPCA applied to the instant
fact situation. Although the activity at issue was filling, the instant case involved two different types of land - nonnavigable manmade mosquito canals
and mangrove wetland. The court considered the fill of the two types of land
to be separate activities involving distinctly different waterbodies. 5o Since the
mosquito canals conveyed pollutants into an arm of a navigable bay, the court
reasoned that Congress dearly intended to regulate activity affecting them.
Thus, the mosquito canals could be considered waters of the United States.51

41. "Even though it seems certain that Congress sought to broaden federal jurisdiction
under the Act, it did so in a manner that appears calculated to force courts to engage in
verbal acrobatics." Id. at 671.
42. Id. at 672.
43. 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
44. Id. at 350.
45. 373 F. Supp. at 672.
46. The mean high water mark is determined by averaging the high tides at a particular
point on the seacoast over a period of approximately nineteen years. Borax Consol. Ltd. v.
City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 27 (1935). For a full discussion of the practical problems
involved in fixing the mean high water mark on the Florida coastline, see Gay, The High
Water Mark: Boundary Between Public and Private Lands, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 553 (1966).
47. See Hoyer, supra note 25, at 23-24.
48. 373 F. Supp. at 670-71. The mean high water mark was used as a boundary for
both federal jurisdiction and land titles bordering on navigable waters. Thus, Borax Consol.
Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), a land title case, has been used as precedent
for determination of the navigability of tidal waters for regulatory purposes. Gay, supra
note 46. This mixture of title and regulatory problems is characteristic of the general development of water law. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 19, at 4.
49. 373 F. Supp. at 676.
50. Id. at 673-74.
51.

Id.
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Although the court indicated that its holding transcended the limits of the
Rivers and Harbors Act,5 2 there is precedent applying that Act to sources
outside navigable waters if the pollutant is eventually conveyed into navigable
waters.5 3 Given this precedent, reliance on FWPCA to regulate the fill of the
canals was not clearly an expansion of federal authority.
Jurisdiction over the second activity, filling the mangrove wetland above
the mean high water line, was "slightly less than apparent."5 4 The court determined that to confer jurisdiction three different sections of FWPCA5 5 must
be read together with the Act's legislative history, which indicated a sensitivity to the value of coastal ecosystems. 5 6 Thus, the fill activity could be enjoined
as a point source affecting a basin area in which shellfish, fishery areas, wildlife,
or recreation might be involved. 57 The court not only avoided direct application of section 1344, which established a permit system for fill in navigable
water - waters of the United States, but also avoided stating whether the
mangrove wetland was a part of the waters of the United States. In fact, the
court's opinion implied that the fill activity may not have taken place in the
waters of the United States, but rather may have created pollution ultimately
introduced into these waters. This position was summarized by the statement
that the "fill activities on land periodically inundated by tidal waters constituted discharges entering 'waters of the United States.' "581 Although it did
not so state, the court seemed to consider the mangrove area as land rather
than water. 59 If this is the case the mangrove wetland was obviously not part
of the waters of the United States. Although the instant decision accomplished
a great deal, it left several questions unanswered. The elimination of navigability as a restriction on federal control removed the difficulty of working
federal jurisdiction around a fictional doctrine of navigability1 ° The court,
however, did not define "waters of the United States," but rather let the
term stand without limiting language. Because the court retired the navigability doctrine, returning to the basic constitutional power of Congress over commerce, the only limitation to be discerned from the instant decision is the
52.

"The legislative history .

. [of FWPCA] manifests a clear intent to break from the

limitations of the Rivers and Harbors Act to get at the sources of pollution." Id. at 673.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1967). There,
Esso dumped petroleum, which flowed from its land across a road and a concrete apron to
rocks on the shore and, finally, into the sea. The court held that the discharge was not too
remote to come within the purview of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
54. 373 F. Supp. at 674.
55. 33 U.S.C. §1251(a) (Supp. II, 1972) (statement of purpose and goals of the Act), 33
U.S.C. §1252(c)(3) (Supp. II, 1972) (an authorization for grants to study basins, included in
which are "coastal waters, sounds and estuaries"), 33 U.S.C. §1344(a), (c) (Stipp. II, 1972) (establishing a permit system for fills, any fill that will affect shellfish, fishery areas, wildlife,
or recreation may be prohibited).
56. 373 F. Supp. at 674.
57. Id. at 675.
58. Id. at 676. "[A]lthough above the mean high water line, [the fill] was periodically
inundated with the waters of Papy's Bayou .... Even the occasional lapping of the bayou
waters has conveyed these pollutants into the waters of the United States." Id. at 675.
59.

Id.

60. Hoyer, supra note 25, at 23.
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current limits of the federal commerce power. 1 Counsel for the Environmental Protection Agency has suggested that certain waterbodies not previously under federal control might be included in the term "waters of the
United States." 62 Tidelands were not mentioned, but the instant court's
injunction provides a basis for considering these areas under federal control
regardless of whether they are within the definition of "waters of the United
States."
The instant decision may have a dramatic impact on the wetlands area.
Unrestrained dredging and filling of the coastal zone is particularly devastating to the marine life that thrives in the wetlands,63 and the filling of
the coastal zone has, in the past, been notably unrestrained.6 4 Therefore, conservationists may properly hail the decision as a victory. Nevertheless, an opposite view will surely be taken by owners of coastal wetlands interested in
the commercial development of their properties. Due process issues will cer-

tainly be raised if the permit system requires that land be left in its natural
state. In addition, the federalism problem, whether exercise of federal power
under the commerce clause may eclipse a state's police power, will be involved
whenever federal policy conflicts with state planning.6 5 Thus, the instant decision foreshadows both new hope for the preservation of the environment
and new problems to be solved.
Mini COCKRELL

61.

AusTlN

See Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry into the Limits of Congressional

Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FoRasr L. REv. 187 (1972). "[A]t least in the

context of modern society, the power to regulate commerce has no practical inherent linguistic
limitations." Id. at 190.
62. Quarles, Memorandum to Regional Counsels from the Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and General Counsel (Feb. 6, 1973), reprinted in 0. GREY, CASES AND MATRIALS
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 693-94 (2d ed. 1973). Bodies of water not previously under federal
control mentioned by Quarles include intrastate lakes, rivers, and-streams used by interstate travelers, commercial fishermen, or interstate industrial operations. As Quarles notes,
these bodies will be brought under federal control on a case-by-case basis.
63. Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional
Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1972). "Perhaps the most tragic aspect of
drainage and dredge and fill operations is the irreversible effect. It is, however, possible for
wetlands to recover from euthropication, oil spills, thermal pollution, pesticides, and
pollution in general." Id. at 28 n.224.
64. See, e.g., Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 351, 352-53 (1970).

65. One example of
Service and the State of
Everglades. F. MALONEY,
FLORIDA ExPERIENcE 258
Bogen, supra note 61.

such a conflict was the disagreement between the National Park
Florida over diversion of water from Lake Okeechobee into the
S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATON: THE
(1968). For a general discussion of the federalism question see
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